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REVIEW REJOINDER
The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies
Privileged Positions
Richard Michael Fischl
In his response to my review essay,1 Professor Massey (note 9) re-
counts the story of two 19th-century preachers--"one a confirmed deter-
minist and the other a disciple of free will"-whose plan to exchange
pulpits is abruptly aborted when the determinist seemingly overplays his
hand on the appointed Sunday. Says he: "[Elver since Creation, God has
ordained that we exchange pulpits today." "Then I won't do it," replies
the intentionalist, who thereupon heads homeward, presumably to preach
the gospel of free will to his own congregation.
Massey offers this story in order to show that the debate between the
adherents of intentionalism and those of determinism has always been
with us and thus to dismiss as "banal" and "irrelevant" cls insights about
the pervasiveness of such "contradictions" within liberal legal thought
(pp. 822 & 823 n.11). According to Massey:
the presence of contradiction in legal thought merely reflects "the
dual nature of human existence"-the idea that we are but a small
part of "the whole intricately balanced organism of the natural
world" that is composed of mutually dependent pairs of opposites.
There can be no concept of light without darkness. The notion of a
determined world lacks meaning without its paired opposite of inten-
tionalism. There is nothing new in contradiction, nor is there any
escape from it. The Crits believe that by identifying contradiction
they have discovered a devastating new truth about liberal hegemony
[but] ... it has been with us since the beginning, whenever that may
have been. If the Crits think that by identifying contradiction we can
transcend the duality of human existence, I am unconvinced. (Pp.
822-23; footnotes omitted)
The author wishes to thank Marc Fajer, Jeremy Paul, Pierre Schlag, and Steve Winter
for their extraordinarily helpful suggestions.
1. Calvin R. Massey, "The Faith Healers," 17 Law & Soc. Inquiry 821 (1992).
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But the preachers' tale seems in fact to convey a rather different lesson
from the one Massey would draw from it-a lesson that suggests that the
efforts of critical scholars to explore and map the recurring analytical
structures of legal thought may be a far more important task than Massey
is prepared to acknowledge.
We might start by imagining a different ending to Massey's story.
Once again, the intentionalist preacher seemingly frustrates Providence by
announcing that he won't go through with the agreed-upon plan to ex-
change pulpits. But then the story takes a twist:
When the intentionalist departs, the determinist looks to the sky,
blesses himself, and says, "Right again, Lord! That stubborn fool
took the bait just like You said he would! No danger now that my
congregation will be swayed by all his free-will claptrap!"
Nor need the story end there:
As the intentionalist heads homeward, he sighs with relief, "Boy, I
can't believe that he bought my righteous indignation number! Now
it's off to the golf course, guilt-free!"
Or even there:
Cut to heaven, where a certain tripartite deity-utterly bored by the
preachers' seemingly perpetual dispute-smiles as He collects on a
golf bet made with the Prince of Darkness.
And so on, down the hall of mirrors.
The point is that the preachers' tale could indeed be recrafted to por-
tray a conflict between intentionalism and determinism that is as timeless
as it is familiar. But that's not the version of the story that Massey tells. Instead,
Massey's tale ends abruptly when the intentionalist plays his trump card-
"Then I won't do it"-leaving the determinist speechless and the audience
at home with what appears to be an indisputable instance of the exercise
of a clever and indomitable free will. The moral is not-as Massey would
have it-one about "the duality of human existence" or about intentional-
ism and determinism interacting as "mutually dependent pairs of oppo-
sites" in some "intricately balanced organism of the natural world."
Rather, the unmistakable lesson is about the triumph of the self-directed
autonomous subject over the countervailing claims of determinism-about
a tilt, not a "balance," in the way that we understand our world.
Massey makes the same analytical move when he attempts to answer
the question that, much to his consternation, critical scholars have assidu-
ously refused to engage: What would you put in its place? Thus, Massey
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"profess[es] a vision" of a world in which "every individual is left as free as
possible, within the legitimate and necessary constraints of our social being, to
realize their personal fulfillment" (p. 828; emphasis added). "Notice," he adds
in the very next sentence, "that my vision recognizes contradiction" (id.),
evidently referring to the prospect of conflict between unconstrained indi-
vidual desire and the exigencies of social life. But once again, Massey's
words seem to have minds of their own; once again, despite his attempts at
"balance," he has unwittingly stacked the deck. For if this "vision" is
supposed to "recognize" the "contradiction" between individual desire
and social life-to respect, as Massey insists, "the dual nature of human
existence" (p. 822; emphasis added)-then why does it give such extraordi-
narily short shrift to the "social" side of the scale? In point of fact, to the
extent that the "social" side is acknowledged at all, it is defined only in
terms of the hazard that it poses for the interests of the "individual": It is
viewed as a "constraint" on "free[dom]" and "personal fulfillment," not as
a source of moral aspiration in and of itself.2 Notice as well that the "indi-
vidual" and the "personal" score a public relations triumph that is similar
to the one enjoyed by the good guys in the Gulf War: Where the "individ-
ual" gets the rhetorical equivalent of a "Patriot" missile ("free[dom]"/"ful-
fillment"), the "social" is stuck with a "Scud" ("constraints"). In the same
vein, the "social" is put to a heavy justificatory burden that the "individ-
ual" is not. Thus, the "constraints of our social being" must be "legiti-
mate"; indeed, they must be "necessary." By contrast, the individual's
claim to "personal fulfillment" is already "legitimate and necessary," since
the individual is to be "left as free as possible" to attain it-much as he
presumably was in liberalism's imaginary pre-social state. (Look, ma, no
mother! Ma? Ma!) And note, finally, the rhetorical trap that is ready to
catch anyone foolhardy enough to take issue with the utility of Massey's
2. Consider just a few of the more salient aspects of human experience that Massey's
"vision" would seem to ignore: caring, community, connection, dependence, empathy, fam-
ily, love, need, obligation, reliance, responsibility. This is ironic, given Massey's suggestion
elsewhere in his piece that liberalism's "talk of rights" ought perhaps to be recast in order to
take into account "a social as well as an individual dimension" (p. 826)-an insight that he
credits to Mary Ann Glendon but which sounds an awful lot like the critique of rights
rhetoric that scholars associated with cls were already making nearly a decade ago. See, e.g.,
Peter Gabel, "The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves," 62 Tex. L Rev. 1563 (1984); Morton J. Horwitz, "Rights," 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L L
Rev. 393 (1988); Duncan Kennedy, "Critical Labor Theory: A Comment," 4 Indus. Rel. LJ.
503 (1981); Staughton Lynd, "Communal Rights," 62 Tex. L Rev. 1417 (1984); Mark
Tushnet, "An Essay on Rights," 62 Tex. L Rev. 1363 (1984); see generally Robin West,
"Jurisprudence and Gender," 55 U. Chi. L Rev. 1 (1988) (comparing liberal, critical, and
feminist views of rights discourse). But whatever its pedigree, this "social... dimension" all
but disappears when Massey attempts to "profess" his "vision"-a phenomenon that seems
to me to be attributable not so much to any failing on Massey's part but to the question that
his "vision" is trying to answer. As I argued in my review essay-and as I shall re-emphasize
in a moment-What would you put in its place? is a question that by its very terms addresses
the self-directed autonomous subject; we should hardly be surprised, then, when the self-
directed autonomous subject provides the reply.
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"vision": "So what are you saying?" we can almost hear some critic of cls
respond, "You folks favor illegitimate and unnecessary constraints on indi-
vidual freedom and personal fulfillment?"
In sum, Massey's "vision" has come here not to "recognize" contra-
diction but to deny it. The message-like the lesson that accompanied the
original version of the preachers' tale-is decidedly not about "the dual
nature of human existence" or "the whole intricately balanced organism of
the natural world" (p. 822). Rather, each of Massey's attempts to state a
live contradiction turns out to be stabilized by a rhetorical asymmetry in
which one of his poles dominates the other: In the preachers' tale, inten-
tionalism gets the last word and thus easily puts determinism in its place;
in Massey's normative "vision," the "individual" dominates the "social"
through a series of rhetorical devices that force the latter to fight all the
battles on the former's turf. And each of these moves is precisely what
critical scholars mean when we talk about the phenomenon of privileging in
liberal legal thought and discourse: Although legal decision making is rife
with determinist assumptions and paternalist interventions, the texts that
we generate-the statutes, the decisions, the treatises, the articles-main-
tain and reproduce a rhetoric of justification in which we almost invariably
project ourselves, in Mark Kelman's words, as "self-determined subjects,
expressing consistent, unambivalent, and unexceptionable desires, seeking
their ends in a private world of voluntary transactions freed from force or
nonnatural necessity by a state that imposes only clear rules against illicit
force" (at 290). Privileging is thus a means, perhaps our most effective
means, of denying the extraordinary distance between this utopian im-
agery and the far more complex experience of social life.
Ironically, Massey's repeated insistence that "contradiction" is ines-
capable is simply another form of this privileging and denial. Listen to
him closely once again:
[T]he presence of contradiction in legal thought merely reflects "the
dual nature of human existence"-the idea that we are but a small part
of "the whole intricately balanced organism of the natural world" that is
composed of mutually dependent pairs of opposites.... There is nothing
new in contradiction, nor is there any escape from it .... [Ilt has been
with us since the beginning, whenever that may have been. If the Crits
think that by identifying contradiction we can transcend the duality of
human existence, I am unconvinced. (Pp. 822-23; emphasis added)
But look what Massey is privileging now: The presence of contradiction in
legal thought, he contends, is natural; it's organic; it's existential; it's ines-
capable; why, it's ... determined. Thus, Massey would elevate "contradic-
tion" to ontological status, obscuring the distinct possibility that we may
have had a hand in this particular construction of our experience-and
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that this habit of dividing up the realm of the possible into a series of
mutually entailed either/or choices (individual vs. social; intentionalism vs.
determinism; etc.) may itself play a significant role in widening the embar-
rassing gap between life and legal theory.
3
Indeed, by attributing these dichotomous conceptual structures to the
"dual nature of human existence," Massey has quite unintentionally set up
the critic of liberal privileging for an extraordinarily effective one-two
punch: Either human activity is intended or it is determined-the "intri-
cately balanced organism of the natural world" simply leaves us with no
other choices-and those who would challenge the former as a naive and
impoverished account of human experience must for that very reason prefer
something closer to the equally naive and impoverished determinist alter-
native. This is precisely how Massey, in his original review of the Guide,
could make the breathtaking leap from Kelman's trenchant critique of in-
tentionalism to the assumption that critical scholars believe that "choice is
illusory" and that "we are all determined by extrinsic factors"; 4 it is pre-
cisely how Daniel Farber could infer from Kelman's critique of value-sub-
jectivity that critical scholars think that "suppressing 'undesirable' groups
would be a good government policy"; 5 it is precisely how Eugene Genovese
could read Kelman's critique of liberalism's venerable public/private dis-
tinction as a "siren call" for "privileging the claims of the state" and ac-
cordingly accuse cls of courting "totalitarian dangers"; 6 and it is precisely
how Massey, in his response here, could conclude from my critique of his
unwitting but persistent privileging of the self-directed autonomous sub-
ject that I must therefore have a "preference for the unrestrained power of
community" (p. 828). The irony, then, is that each of these leaps and
inferences represents another instance of the very privileging that Kelman
is talking about: Surely no one in her right mind could really believe that
choice is illusory, that we should suppress undesirable groups, that we
should flirt with totalitarianism, that we should embrace unrestrained
community power. What choice do we have, then, but to Stand by Our
Man, the self-directed autonomous subject?
7
3. For insightful elaborations of this point, see the work of Pierre Schlag (particularly
"Contradiction and Denial," 87 Mich. L Rev. 1216 (1989), and "Normativity and the Poli-
tics of Form," 139 U. Pa. L Rev. 801, 805, 907 (1991)) and of my colleague Steve Winter
(particularly Foreword: "On Building Houses," 69 Tex. L Rev. 1595, 1597 (1991), and "For
What It's Worth," 26 Law & Soc Rev. 879 (1992)).
4. Calvin R. Massey, "Law's Inferno," 39 Hastings LJ. 1269, 1294 (1988) (book review).
5. Daniel Farber, "Down by Law," New Republic, 4 Jan. 1988, at 36, 38.
6. Eugene D. Genovese, "Critical Legal Studies as Radical Politics and World View," 3
Yale J.L & Hum. 131, 144-45, 147 (1991) (book review).
7. Within the legitimate and necessary constraints of his social being, naturally.
For the record, the misreading of Kelman and cls continues unabated. Thus, Massey is
simply wrong when he suggests that critical scholars subscribe to the "Western myth of
progress-the idea that life involves an inexorable march toward human betterment"-and
thus naively believe that the insights we might generate about liberal legal thought will nec-
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Which brings us to what may be the most subtle and yet the most
powerful agent of privileging at work in Massey's response: the continuing
obsession with The Question-What would you put in its place?-that has
plagued critical scholarship from the get-go. As I attempted to show in my
review essay, the difficulty with The Question is that it assumes precisely
the premises that critical scholars have been urging us to examine and
rethink: that we are self-directed autonomous subjects who "make" law
but that law plays no important role in making us; that "law" is an object
that we can reshape simply by issuing "it" solemn normative prescriptions;
that by changing law we can thereby remake social life to conform to our
desires; that we are Supreme Court Justices issuing opinions--or legisla-
tures enacting statutes-rather than merely law professors writing articles
that far more often than not perform the same function in the life of our
profession that the chaplain's i re-attack blessing of the troops does for the
military. The problem with The Question, then, is that it reflects and
reinforces each of these beliefs and enables us to assume that our own
attempts to provide answers to it are significant and meaningful-and thus
to portray ourselves, to ourselves, as "whole and intact, as self-directing
individual liberal humanist subjects at once rational, morally competent,
and in control of their own situations, the captain of their own ships, the
essarily lead to a better world (p. 825). In fact, Kelman spends the better part of a chapter
describing the rejection of that myth by critical scholars (at 213-41), and accordingly the
critical claim is far more modest: How can a responsible search for an "escape" from our
current predicament even be contemplated without an honest and painstaking attempt at an
examination of the predicament itself?
Similarly, compare Massey's reference to Roberto Unger's supposed "infatuation" with
"the thoroughly brutal, vicious, and totalitarian politics and practices of the Red Guards of
the Chinese Revolution" (note 13) with the decidely uninfatuated and antitotalitarian analy-
ses of those "politics and practices" in Unger's False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social The-
ory in the Service of Radical Democracy, part 1 of Politics: A Work in Constructive Social Theory
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), the work to which Massey evidently refers.
Thus, Unger argues that the Cultural Revolution was a "failed attempt" to break out of the
rigid institutional structures of the Soviet communist model (id. at 241-46); that the poten-
tially revolutionary practices of "criticism and self-criticism" were ultimately deployed not to
"escape from the consolidation of bureaucratic power" but as "a weapon of intimidation in
an elite conflict" and "a subtle method for reasserting consensus and control," so that the
"fundamentals of power at every level would remain out of bounds to conflict and com-
plaint" (id. at 242-43); that these critical practices-even in the hands of those who utilized
them in an "attempt to chasten and, if possible, to destroy the established bureaucracies of
party and state and to produce a new man or woman, new above all in their attitude toward
authority"-were undermined by the "single-minded focus" on the struggle between elites
and masses, so that the "crudest allocations of personal role, or the most rigid conceptions
of the style of association suitable to each domain of social life, could be accepted so long as
they did not overtly involve the feared contrast between elite and mass" (id. at 568-70); and
that the Cultural Revolution was in the end "a case of failure in breakthrough toward an
alternative mode of socialism and industrialism, unless the breakthrough is defined as a
return to a clearer version of preexisting institutions, a return permitting limited decentraliz-
ing experiments and achieved at the cost of a protracted ordeal of provoked, uncontrolled,
and suppressed insurrection" (id. at 245).
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Hercules of their own empires, the author of their own texts." 8 As Mas-
sey's unsuccessful efforts here to "recognize" contradiction and to capture
"the duality of human existence" suggest, it ain't necessarily so.
But what The Question does for the questioner is only half the story.
Consider as well what The Question does to the dialogue with the ques-
tioned. Imagine for a moment that you share a home with a spouse or a
significant other. On the one hand, you love this person very much and
are dedicated to "making life" with him and to making your relationship
"work." On the other, you are experiencing some difficulties that cannot
fairly be characterized as "minor": He frequently interrupts you when you
are trying to make a point; he has on a number of occasions said things
that have humiliated you in social settings; and he has repeatedly made
important decisions without consulting you in advance or taking your in-
terests and desires into account. While you are certain that none of this is
intentional on his part, you are understandably quite concerned about the
source of these seemingly related behavior patterns. You are worried that
they represent some sort of subconscious response to things that you are
doing in the relationship; you are even more worried that they do not.
The trouble is, every time you attempt to discuss the subject with him-
every time you try to get him to talk with you about what you think is
happening, where it might be coming from, and how it all is making you
feel-he has the same response: "It's Karl, isn't it?" he will say, referring
to a man you knew and loved in college, who is still single and who still
drops by to see you when he passes through town. "You just can't let go
of him, can you?" he adds in an accusing tone. "You just can't stop think-
ing that you might be happier if you were with him than you are with me."
Rhetorically, this is an enormously effective move on your partner's part:
With a single stroke, he has managed (1) to terminate further discussion of
his behavior; (2) to change the subject to focus on the issue of your motives
and desires; and (3) to defend the status quo by raising the stakes with the
not-too-subtle suggestion that you might be planning to... well, put some-
thing in his place.
This, then, is the performative effect of The Question in modern legal
discourse: It effectively stalls any examination of the recurring analytical
structures of liberal legal thought. It changes the subject to the issue of the
motives of the critic. (They're almost surely oedipal. Why can't we leave it
at that and quit dragging Stalin into it?9) It privileges the status quo by
suggesting that the only alternative is an irresponsible leap in the direction
of liberalism's usual suspects. It's a trap that betrays our capacity even to
begin to understand our current predicament, a task that is challenging
enough as it is.
8. Schlag, 139 U Pa. L Rev. at 805.
9. Or the Red Guards, for that matter; see supra note 7.
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I certainly find it challenging, for I don't mean to suggest-as Massey
would have it (note 3)-that critical scholars are somehow "freed from the
straitjacket" of the complex interplay between law, culture, and our struc-
tures of thought that we are attempting to bring into view. Although it is
surely the case that some of us speak as if we have found a vantage point
from which to examine this interplay "from the outside"-a privileged
position of our own, so to speak-I suspect that most critical scholars
would readily admit that the opposite is the case, that we experience the
same contradictory beliefs and impulses (self vs. other, public vs. private,
rules vs. standards, intentionalism vs. determinism, etc.) as everyone else.
The difference lies in our attempts at self-conscious awareness of these an-
tinomies and their animating conceptual structures-and in our sense that
this is a legitimate and in fact vital area of scholarly inquiry if we are to
avoid mere apologetics-not in our successes thus far in overcoming them.
But I'm having a d~j vu; haven't I written these words before? 10
10. 1 have. See "The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies," 17 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 779, 802-3 (1992).
